Difference in Negotiating styles of the US and Indonesia in Tariff Negotiations
The US-Indonesia tariff case is interesting not only from the point of view of basic international relations, when we observe the interaction of a great power and a middle power and the influence of objective factors of the external environment on their behavior and decision-making process (more on this in the post below), but also as a subjective exchange of opinions between actors coming from different political and business cultures.
Negotiating style does not always affect the course or success of certain negotiations, especially when they last long enough and the parties get used to each other, but the political sphere assumes that negotiators behave not in accordance with their personal style, but with the style of their administration and the political culture adopted in the country. Politics and diplomacy in all countries are formal, traditional spheres with strict discipline and rules of the game that differ from the logic of everyday life.
The American negotiating style under Trump is quite stereotypical and is based on the classic ideas of American exceptionalism (other countries are secondary, America First), "masculine" competitive culture (pressure, zero-sum game), individualism and economic pragmatism (We don't have to sign deals, they have to sign deals with us), a kind of Scrooge-McDuck capitalism. Trump has set a certain corporate tone with his signature style.
For example, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are well-educated and have extensive political and professional experience, but their statements and actions are oriented towards Trump's Republican electorate and the stated goals of the current administration, as well as the subjective ideas of the leader himself. Thus, Rubio, at the meeting of foreign ministers of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur, tried to be polite and repeated mantras about the central role of ASEAN, while Trump's letters about raising tariffs and threats to "punish" countries for choosing the wrong allies said the opposite. Real steps indicated that it was more important for American interests to push through Indonesia or Vietnam with the Philippines, signaling to China about the growth of American influence and the lack of alternative to American regional hegemony. Bessent's meetings with the Vietnamese delegation generally became a meme due to the official's facial expressions, demonstrating certain "positive" emotions. Moreover, the Indonesian negotiating team faced an inflexible American position.
The Democrats of the Biden and Obama administrations were more cautious and took into account the specifics of the ASEAN countries, attracted Indonesian experts, tried to rely more on soft power and integration agreements. Obama, who spent several years living in Indonesia with his mother, the famous Indonesian Stanley Ann Dunham, and his Indonesian sister from his mother's second marriage, has made particular progress in this area. The Biden administration has relied more on power strategies due to the growing confrontation with China, but it has not sought to put pressure on Indonesia, relying on high technology and support for some of Indonesia's initiatives in order to emphasize its importance on the world stage. The first Trump administration maintained minimal contacts with Indonesia, but these were more than formal.
The Indonesian negotiating style is less dependent on the figure of the president, as it largely repeats the internal Indonesian style of interaction between political factions and influence groups. In contrast to the American culture, Indonesian culture is based on collective relationships, social face, and hierarchy. Negotiators always rely on "feminine", flexible strategies and strive for a "win-win" situation, since the Indonesian political environment is a complex balance of interests and resource distribution. When one side is dissatisfied and begins to demand special conditions, everyone tries to negotiate and come to a common denominator, if this does not violate the boundaries. Pressure is regarded as a loss of face, and rudeness as a direct insult. Prabowo, as a Javanese aristocrat, a descendant of a family of national heroes of Indonesia, always perfectly balanced in this system, and its principles were followed by presidents before him. Each of them had their own specifics, their own programs and emphases, but no one violated the historically established rules of the game, understandable from birth to both an ordinary citizen and a politician.
The second pillar of Indonesian psychology is the clear awareness of the people and elites of Indonesia's importance in the world, its perception as a respected "active and independent" player in the international arena and in the region, which is characterized at the everyday level as "what will they say about us, and do they respect us and our leader?" Indonesians are very patriotic, this is noticeable in social networks and comments and reactions of Indonesians to any mention of their country in the news. Such a perception is also characteristic of many of Indonesia's neighbors, therefore negotiations in ASEAN or along the South-South line are held in an atmosphere of mutual respect, emphasizing each other's importance and providing an appropriate ceremonial reception (as was the case at the ASEAN summit, SPIEF or BRICS summit). And this is quite consistent with the ideas of diplomacy as it should be.
Understanding Trump's dissatisfaction, Prabowo and the Airlangga Hartarto delegation approached the process in the Indonesian way: trying to find out what the dissatisfaction was, come to a consensus, give the US due attention by emphasizing its status, importance for Indonesia and demonstrating a willingness to make significant concessions to resolve the problem, while outlining its red lines and demands. Indonesia emphasized that although the US is important, Indonesia is no less important and has its own voice, which must be respected, like the voices of others. This strategy definitely caused a break in the patterns in the American camp, when the country on the one hand "bent" and tries to "bargain" for itself at least something, and on the other makes "unacceptable" steps and statements. It can be assumed that this influenced Trump's recent steps.
The real importance of Indonesia in the strategic region for the United States obviously kept Trump from wanting to "put Indonesia in its place" and the parties managed to reach an agreement, but it also became clear that both the Indonesian elites (even the pro-Western ones) and ordinary citizens faced a public humiliation of their statehood, which shocked them. The country's president was, as if in jest, called a "very respected, very smart guy", and the delegation of professional negotiators was perceived as "petitioners" and ultimatums were imposed on them. Moreover, Trump stated that "the United States has full access to Indonesia" and that "the United States really needs Indonesian copper and they will use it." These statements are not only neocolonialist, but also affect freedom (Merdeka) - the central concept of Indonesian self-awareness. Ironically, the country that makes such statements was itself founded on similar principles. The Indonesian side will certainly find a way to explain this positively and, in the best Javanese traditions, will continue to demonstrate excellent relations with the United States, but I am sure that such steps will not be forgotten soon and will have a more than serious impact on the American image in the region.
P.S. This is my subjective opinion, based on personal experience of negotiations in different years and the impressions of some of my Indonesian colleagues on current events.
P.P.S. I will separately add a selection of facial expressions of Finance Minister Bessent at a meeting with the Vietnamese delegation on tariffs.
